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Abourezk v. Reagan: Curbing Recent
Abuses of the Executive
Immigration Power
Abourezk v. Reagan I concerned the State Department's denial of visas to
several aliens pursuant to the "public interest provision" of the McCar-
ran-Walter Act2 (the "McCarran Act"). The McCarran Act is America's
basic immigration law and, inter alia, sets out thirty-three categories of
aliens ineligible for admission to the United States.3 Abourezk v. Reagan
involved two of these categories: subsection (27), excluding aliens who
seek to enter the United States to engage in activities prejudicial to the
public interest (the "public interest provision"), and subsection (28),
excluding aliens who are or have been anarchists or communists (the
"anti-communist provision").
The plaintiffs in Abourezk, citizens and residents who invited the
aliens to come to the United States to speak, made three arguments to
the district court, two statutory and one constitutional. First, the plain-
tiffs argued that the McCarran Act's public interest provision applied
only to aliens whose "activities" would threaten the welfare, safety, or
security of the United States and did not reach aliens whose mere pres-
ence or entry constituted a threat (the "activities/entry" issue).4 Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs contended that visa denials under the public interest
section can only be made on national security or safety grounds and not
for reasons of foreign policy.5 Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the visa
denials violated their first amendment rights of association and speech,
which included their right to receive information and ideas. 6
The District Court for the District of Columbia granted the State
Department's motion for summary judgment. 7 The court of appeals
vacated the district court's decision and remanded for additional consid-
1. 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated and remanded, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), aff'd mem., 56 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1987) (3-3 decision with
Blackmun, J., and Scalia, J., not participating).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)) [hereinafter McCarran Act].
3. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (West Supp. 1987). Note that these criteria for
admission govern both immigrant and non-immigrant visas.
4. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 884.
5. Id. at 885.
6. Id. at 886.
7. Id. at 888.
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eration of the activities/entry issue.8 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals by a 3-3 vote without issuing an opinion.9
The court of appeals decision (Ginsburg, J., with Bork, J., dissent-
ing) focused on two aspects of the case. First, regarding the activi-
ties/entry issue, the court of appeals held that the district court erred by
dismissing the case in light of the ambiguous legislative history and
inadequate record of agency construction. 10 The court also considered
the plaintiffs' claim, not raised before the district court, that the State
Department improperly used subsection (27) to exclude the aliens,
rather than subsection (28) (the anti-communist provision). The plain-
tiffs charged that the use of subsection (27) circumvented the McGovern
Amendment to the McCarran Act," which limits administrative discre-
tion to exclude aliens solely because they are communists. 12 The court
found that the government classified the aliens as threats to the public
interest at least partly on the basis of statutory misinterpretation.13
Concerned that the improper usage of the subsection (27) public inter-
est provision would render subsection (28) superfluous and nullify the
Congressional will expressed in the McGovern Amendment, 14 the court
held that the government may use the public interest provision only if
the reason for exclusion is independent of, not in addition to, the alien's
communist affiliation. 15
This Note contends that the court of appeals decision is unsatisfac-
tory. The traditional deference of the courts to the Executive in the
immigration area is less appropriate when the immigration laws impli-
cate the first amendment interests of citizens. In resolving the statutory
construction issue, the court of appeals should have considered the
plaintiffs' constitutional interests in meeting with and hearing the
excluded aliens. This Note suggests that the doctrine of clear statement
and the rule against standardless delegations mandate a narrow con-
struction of the subsection (27) public interest exclusion, thereby avoid-
ing the serious constitutional issues raised by an expansive reading.
Section I of this Note explains the statutory framework of the ideo-
logical exclusion provisions of the McCarran Act. Section II examines
the Supreme Court's deferential standard ofjudicial review in the immi-
gration area. Section III presents the facts of Abourezk and examines the
opinions of the district court and court of appeals. Section IV critiques
the court of appeals' analysis and suggests how the court could have
8. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
9. 56 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1987) (mem.) (Blackmun and Scalia, J., not
participating).
10. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061-62.
11. Id. at 1056-57.
12. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-105,
§ 112, 91 Stat. 844, 848 (1977) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982)) [hereinafter the
McGovern Amendment]; see infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
13. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1060.
14. Id. at 1057.
15. Id. at 1058.
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resolved the plaintiffs' claim. Section V proposes that, while the Judicial
branch usually defers to the Executive branch on matters of immigration
law, accepted rules of statutory construction require courts to narrowly
construe the vague public interest provision of the McCarran Act in
order to avoid any encroachment on first amendment interests.
I. The Statutory Framework of the MeCarran-Walter Act
In 1952 Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act,16 which codified the
existing body of immigration law into one comprehensive statute.
17
The McCarran Act sets out the division of administrative responsibilities
for immigration, the criteria governing both immigrant and nonimmi-
grant entry and exclusion, and the procedures governing waivers of
inadmissibility. 18
A. Administrative Division of Responsibilities
The McCarran Act divides responsibilities for issuing visas between the
State Department and the Justice Department. 19 The State Department,
through its consular offices abroad, initially determines the admissibility
of visa applicants. 20 The Justice Department, however, may review and
reverse State Department determinations.
2 1
B. The Ideological Exclusion Provisions
The McCarran Act lists thirty-three classes of aliens ineligible to receive
U.S. visas.2 2 Aliens may be denied admission on ideological grounds
under either subsection 212(a) (27) or (28). Subsection (27), the "public
interest" provision, authorizes the exclusion of "[a]liens who the consu-
lar official or Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to
enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in
activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger
the welfare, safety, or security of the United States .... ",23 Subsection
(28), the "anti-communist" provision, requires the exclusion of any
alien who is or has been an adherent of anarchism or communism.
24
16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
17. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACE § 1.3b, at 1-
15 to 17 (1975) [hereinafter GORDON & ROSENFIELD].
18. Id.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (1982); see also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
17, § 1.6a, at 1-37 to 38.
20. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 17, § 1.6a, at 1-37.
21. Id. at 1-37 to 38.
22. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (West Supp. 1987). The McCarran Act autho-
rizes the exclusion of aliens on a variety of grounds other than ideology. Among
them are insanity (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)-(4) (1982)), drug addiction or alcoholism (8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1982)), affliction with contagious disease (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)
(1982)), pauperism (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8) (1982)), and criminality (8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9) (1982)).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
24. The subsection reads in relevant part:
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C. The Waiver Provisions
Section 212 (d) (3) of the McCarran Act provides for a waiver of inadmis-
sibility, thereby allowing the issuance of temporary visas to many aliens
otherwise inadmissible. 25 This section gives the Secretary of State and
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into
the United States:
(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the fol-
lowing classes:
(A) Aliens who are anarchists;
(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with
any organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all organized
government;
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist Party of
the United States, (ii) any other totalitarian party of the United States, (iii) the
Communist Political Association, (iv) the Communist Party or any other total-
itarian party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any
political or geographical subdivision of any foreign state, (v) any section, sub-
sidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party, or
(vi) the direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party,
regardless of what name such group or organization may have used, may
have been, or may hereafter adopt... ;
(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who
advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dicta-
torship, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advo-
cates the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dicta-
torship... ;
(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with
any organization that advocates or teaches (i) the overthrow by force, vio-
lence, or other unconstitutional means of the Government of the United
States or all forms of law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlaw-
ful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers ... of the Government of the
United States or of any other organized government, because of his or their
official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of prop-
erty; or (iv) sabotage;
(G) Aliens who write or publish, or cause to be written or published, or who
knowingly circulate, distribute, print, or display, or knowingly cause to be
circulated, distributed, printed, published or displayed, or who knowingly
have in their possession for the purpose of circulation, publication, distribu-
tion, or display, any written or printed matter, advocating or teaching opposi-
tion to all organized government, or advocating or teaching [the doctrines
described in subsection (F)(i)-(iv) of this paragraph]; or (v) the economic,
international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the estab-
lishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship;
(H) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization that
[engages in the conduct described in subsection (G) of this paragraph]....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
25. Id. § 1182(d)(3). The subsection reads in relevant part:
(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a
nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be
ineligible for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in
subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (27), (29), and (33))
may, after approval of the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Sec-
retary of State or by the consular officer that the alien may be admitted tem-
porarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and be admitted
Vol. 21
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the Attorney General wide discretion to issue waivers for humanitarian
or public interest reasons. 2 6 The waiver does not apply to aliens inad-
missible under the subsection (27) public interest provision; such aliens
are statutorily ineligible for a waiver.2 7 Aliens excludable under the
subsection (28) anti-communist provision, however, are eligible for
waivers, which the State Department routinely grants.28 Adverse deci-
sions on waiver applications, however, are unappealable. 2 9
D. The McGovern Amendment
The "McGovern Amendment" of 197730 significantly altered the
McCarran Act's ideological exclusion scheme. Prior to the McGovern
Amendment, any applicant "denominated by subsection (28) ... [was]
automatically excluded unless the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General affirmatively decided otherwise."'' a Under this system, how-
ever, the State Department received wide criticism for failing to grant
waivers to alien communists seeking to attend conferences in the United
States.3 2 In 1977, Congress decided that such refusals violated the
recently adopted Helsinki Accords,3 3 which committed signatories to
promote the free movement of people and ideas across national bor-
ders.3 4 Congress designed the McGovern Amendment to curtail the
Secretary of State's discretion to refuse to make waiver recommenda-
tions for political reasons.3 5 The Amendment requires that the "Secre-
tary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a
nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludable . . . [pursuant to
into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the
Attorney General....
Id. Section 1182(a)(29) authorizes the exclusion of aliens who the consular official
has reason to believe would engage in espionage, sabotage, or attempts to overthrow
the government by force or violence. Id. § 1182(a)(29). Section 1182(a)(33) autho-
rizes the exclusion of aliens who were former members of the Nazi party. Id.
§ 1182(a)(33).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1653, 1706. If consular officials find a waiver appropriate,
they will forward a favorable recommendation to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service or the Attorney General.
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (1982). Aliens who fall under the subsection (29)
national security exclusion provision and the subsection (33) Nazi provision are also
statutorily ineligible for a waiver. Id.
28. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768 n.7 (1972).
29. 8 C.F.R. § 212.4 (1986).
30. See supra note 12.
31. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.,
dissenting).
32. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 17, § 2.53b, at 2-366 (1987 Cum. Supp.).
33. See 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982); S. REP. No. 194,95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1625, 1634-35.
34. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
35. The Amendment deprived the Secretary of State of the discretion to deny a
§ 212(d)(3)(A) waiver to a subsection (28) communist alien, even if he found that
admission of that alien would be contrary to the public interest. 22 U.S.C. § 2691
(1982).
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§ 212(a)(28)] but who is otherwise admissible .... recommend that the
Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a
visa .... ,,36 The Secretary of State may decline to issue a favorable rec-
ommendation only after determining that a waiver applicant constitutes
a threat to national security and reporting the denial to both Houses of
Congress.3 7
H1. Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions
A. Judicial Deference to Congress in the Immigration Area
Courts have long recognized the virtually unlimited power of Congress
in the area of immigration. 38 The Supreme Court infers this authority
from Congress' power to regulate commerce, 39 make treaties, 40 declare
war,4 1 and prescribe uniform rules of naturalization. 4 2 Generally, the
Court describes the power to regulate immigration as an inherent attri-
bute of national sovereignty. 43 The Court has also characterized a
36. Id.
37. Id. Congress recently refused to adopt a proposal by the State Department
which would permit the Secretary to consider "foreign policy factors" as well as
national security interests in making waiver decisions under the McGovern Amend-
ment. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellants, app. B at 2 (letter from Alvin Paul Drischler, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State, to George Bush, President of the United States Senate (Oct. 18,
1983))).
38. See I GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 17, § 2.2a, at 2-15 to -18.
39. "The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with Foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .. " U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (Congress has
the power to pass a law regulating immigration as part of commerce of this country
with foreign nations).
40. "[The President] shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. "The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o declare War... U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
42. "The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o establish an Uniform Rule of
Naturalization .. " U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4; see also Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 543 (1895) ("... every sovereign nation has the power, inherent
in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its domains .. "); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Cases), 130 U.S. 581, 604-09 (1892) (the government has the power to exclude for-
eigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interest requires such
exclusion).
43. See generally Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (the Court has "long rec-
ognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute")
(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States cc rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953));
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (the exclusion
of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty, inherent in the executive power to con-
trol the foreign affairs of the nation); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, 290 (1903) (it is an accepted principle of international law that every sover-
eign nation has the power, inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation,
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 231 (1896) (the right to exclude aliens is an inherent and ina-
lienable right of every sovereign).
Vol. 21
1988 Abourezk v. Reagan
nation's right to control alien entry as a fundamental tenet of interna-
tional law. 44 Congress, not the courts, defines the limits of the immigra-
tion power.45 The Supreme Court has stated that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over [immigration]. ' 4 6 Thus the Court regularly approves facially dis-
criminatory and arbitrary procedures governing aliens which, if applied
to citizens, would be grossly unconstitutional.
4 7
44. See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (that
aliens are vulnerable to expulsion after long residence may seem severe, but it is a
weapon of defense and reprisal that international law confirms as part of a sover-
eign's inherent powers); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 192 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power ... to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions .... ).
45. Indeed, in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), Justice Frankfurter noted
that
[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are
peculiarly concerned with the political conduct ofgovernment.... [IT]hat the
formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body
politic as any aspect of our government.
Id. at 531; see also Fiallo, 430 U.S at 792 (the Court has "long recognized the power to
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Gov-
ernment's political department largely immune from judicial control") (quoting
Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 210); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589-90 (policies towards aliens
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches, as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry); United States ex rel. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543 (it is not within the prov-
ince of any court, unless authorized by law, to review a determination by the political
branch to exclude an alien); Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 547 (Congress's power to
exclude aliens or to prescribe the conditions upon which they may enter this country
is well settled to be beyond judicial intervention); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 731 (1892) (on the question of whether and upon what conditions an
alien may be permitted to remain within the United States, the courts cannot prop-
erly express an opinion upon the wisdom, policy or justice of congressional meas-
ures); Nishimura Ehiu, 142 U.S. at 660 (it is not within the province of the judiciary to
order that foreigners should be permitted to enter the United States. As to aliens,
the decisions of executive or administrative officers are due process of law); Chae
Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (in war or in peace, legislative determinations regarding
the admissibility of aliens are conclusive upon the judiciary).
46. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
47. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 ("If... the government of the United
States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country ... to be dangerous to its peace and security" it may
lawfully exclude them); see also M. KoNvrrz, CIVIL RiGrrs IN IMMIGRATON 39-46
(1953) (The Supreme Court has held that immigration statutes which explicitly man-
date discriminatory treatment for certain aliens solely on the basis of race are consti-
tutional). Conversely, statutes in the domestic area which facially discriminate
against any persons solely on account of race are presumed to violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such laws survive constitutional scru-
tiny only if supported by the most compelling governmental interests. See generally L.
TRIBE, CONsTrrurONAL LAw § 16-6, at 1000 (1984).
The Court continues to recognize the validity of a constitutional distinction
between aliens and citizens. In Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court
upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2), which barred aliens from receiving medicare benefits
unless they had been admitted for permanent residence and had lived in the country
for at least five years. The Court noted that "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable ifapplied to citizens." Id. at 79-80; accord Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1976)
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B. Constitutional Interests and Congress' Power Over Immigration
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress' plenary power over immigra-
tion most recently in Kleindienst v. Mandel.48 In Kleindienst, a group of
university professors invited the Belgian Marxist scholar Ernst Mandel
to the United States to speak. The State Department, however,
excluded Mandel pursuant to section 212 (a) (28) of the McCarran Act as
an alien who espoused the international doctrines of world commu-
nism. 49 The plaintiffs in Kleindienst contended that the denial to Mandel
of a section 212(d)(3)(a) waiver was "arbitrary and capricious" and that
the subsection (28) anti-communist provision violated their first and
fifth amendment rights.5 0 A three judge district court held that,
although Mandel had no personal right to entry, the ideological exclu-
sion provisions of the McCarran Act violated the plaintiffs' first amend-
ment right to hear him.5 1 The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,
reversed. 52
The Kleindienst Court recognized that the exclusion of Mandel impli-
cated first amendment rights, but held that Congress' interest in regulat-
ing immigration outweighed the plaintiffs' first amendment interests.5 3
The majority stated that
when the Executive exercises [the immigration] power negatively on the
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither
look behind the exercise of that discretion nor test it by balancing its justi-
fication against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal
communication with the applicant.5 4
Courts have subsequently applied the Kleindienst "facially legitimate
and bona fide" test to dispose of constitutional challenges to McCarran
Act visa denials. 55 These cases suggest that plaintiffs have found this
(Court upheld §§ 101(b)(1)(d) and 101(b)(2) of the McCarran Act, which denied
parental immigration preference to fathers of illegitimate children).
48. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
49. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 760. The Court decided Kleindienst before Congress
passed the McGovern Amendment; therefore, it was still within the Secretary of
State's statutory authority to refuse to grant a § 212(d)(3)(A) waiver to a subsection
(28) communist alien whose presence would not threaten the national security. See
supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
51. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
52. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
53. Id. at 768-69. The majority, however, rejected the government's argument
that other alternatives (writings, recordings, phone hookups) might suffice. The
Court reasoned that no substitute exists for face-to-face contact. Id. at 765.
54. Id. at 770.
55. See NGO Committee on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3635 (S.D.N.Y.
June 10, 1982), aff'd mem., No. 82-6147 (2d Cir. June 18, 1982) (district court sus-
tained the subsection (28) anti-communist exclusion of 320 Japanese peace activists,
whose McGovern Amendment waivers had been denied by the Attorney General, on
the bare assertion by counsel that "national security" was involved); EI-Werfalli v.
Shultz, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (district court found that a subsection (27)
public interest visa denial to a Libyan national studying aircraft maintenance in the
United States was justified on national security grounds). But cf Allende v. Shultz,
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test a difficult obstacle to overcome.56
Ill. The Case: Abourezk v. Reagan
Abourezk v. Reagan57 consolidated the challenges to three unrelated visa
denials. The State Department denied the visa applications of Nino
Pasti,58 Olga Finlay and Leonor Lezcano, 59 and Nicaraguan Interior
Minister Tomas Borge.60 Borge, for example, had planned speaking
engagements with journalists, religious groups, and at universities.6 1 In
an official statement explaining the denial, State Department spokesman
John Hughes said "[t]he thinking might well [have been] that [Borge]
would use those particular occasions as platforms for the same kind of
rhetoric we have seen before." 62 Although each of the excluded aliens
605 F. Supp. 1220 (D.Mass. 1985) (district court denied summaryjudgment for State
Department because the Department failed to provide any fact supporting a "facially
legitimate and bona fide reason" for the exclusion).
56. See supra note 55.
57. 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated and remanded, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.Cir.
1986), af'd men., 56 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1987) (3-3 decision with Blackmun
and Scalia, J., not participating).
58. In Cronin v. Shultz, No. 83-3895, plaintiff disarmament groups challenged
the State Department's refusal to issue a visa to Nino Pasti. Pasti, a former NATO
General and a former member of the Italian Senate, actively opposed the deployment
of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. He was also affiliated with the World
Peace Council, which the State Department claimed was an instrumentality of Soviet
foreign policy. After receiving invitations to speak at several disarmament rallies in
the United States, Pasti applied to the American Consulate in Rome for a visa. The
consular officer found him ineligible pursuant to the § 212(a)(28) anti-communist
provisions of the McCarran Act and requested an advisory opinion from the State
Department as to the possibility of a § 212(d)(3) waiver. The State Department
instructed the consulate to deny Pasti a visa on § 212(a)(27) public interest grounds.
Aliens excluded pursuant to subsection (27) are statutorily ineligible for waivers.
Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 882; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREE TRADE IN
IDEAS: A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIvE 6 (1984) [hereinafter AMERICAN CIVIL LIBER-
TIES UNION].
59. In City of New York v. Shultz, No. 83-3741, the New York City Council chal-
lenged the State Department's refusal to issue visas to Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodri-
guez Lezcano. Finlay and Lezcano, Cuban nationals, are experts in the area of family
law and the status of women. Finlay is the Cuban representative to the United
Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Lezcano has served as the Secretary
of Foreign Relations for the Federation of Cuban Women. Both women were invited
to visit the United States to speak before the New York City Commission on the
Status of Women as well as various religious, university, and women's groups. The
State Department denied their applications for visas on § 212(a)(27) public interest
grounds, based on their affiliation with the Federation of Cuban Women, which the
State Department deemed a "mass organization" of the Cuban Communist Party.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 58, at 5. "The Director of the Office of
Cuban Affairs at the State Department explained that their visit would have been
prejudicial to the public interest by providing these two officials with forums for
propagating Cuban policies before U.S. audiences." Id. (citing a letter, dated Oct.
21, 1983, from Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, to Thomas
H. Holloway, Director, Cornell University, Latin American Studies Program).
60. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
61. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 881-82.
62. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1983, at A16, col. 5.
Cornell International Law Journal
were affiliated with organizations proscribed under the section
212(a)(28) anti-communist exclusion, 63 the State Department barred
their entry under the broader public interest provision of section
212(a) (27).64
A. The District Court Decision
The plaintiffs in Abourezk, citizens and residents who invited the aliens to
come to the United States to speak, initially made three arguments to
the district court, two statutory and one constitutional. First, the plain-
tiffs contended that by using the term "activities" as opposed to "entry"
in the subsection (27) public interest exclusion, Congress demonstrated
an intent to bar only those aliens whose conduct, rather than mere pres-
ence, would prejudice the public interest. 65 Second, the plaintiffs
argued that Congress intended subsection (27) denials only for threats
to national security or safety grounds and not for "foreign policy" rea-
sons.6 6 Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the exclusions violated their
first amendment rights. 6 7 They charged that the State Department
excluded the aliens because of the content of their expected speech.
The exclusions, therefore, constituted an impermissible, content-based
burden on the plaintiffs' first amendment right to meet and speak with
the excluded aliens. 68
The district court granted the government's summary judgment
motion.6 9 It rejected plaintiffs' activities/entry argument, holding that
the distinction is one without a difference. 70 The district court also
63. If an excluded alien is denied a visa pursuant to the § 212(a)(28) anti-commu-
nist exclusion of the McCarran Act, the McGovern Amendment requires the Secre-
tary of State to recommend to the Attorney General that a § 212(d)(3)(A) waiver of
inadmissibility be granted. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
64. Aliens excluded pursuant to subsection (27) are not protected by the McGov-
ern Amendment because they are statutorily ineligible for § 212(d)(3)(A) waivers.
See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
65. Abourezk, 592 F.Supp. at 884-85. Subsection (27) authorizes the exclusion of
aliens who will "engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public inter-
est .... 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
66. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 885-86.
67. Id. at 886.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 880.
70. Id. at 884. The court reasoned as follows:
On a strictly textual basis, that contention is not unpersuasive, for the stat-
utory provision mentions only "activities." However, in this context at least,
the distinction between an alien's activities and his presence in the United
States is one without a difference. The best proof of that proposition is the
case of the former Shah of Iran. The mere entry of the Shah into the United
States and his presence in this country had the most serious consequences for
the United States, including the seizure of American hostages in Teheran and
all that flowed from that episode, including ultimately the loss of life in con-
nection with the abortive rescue operation. It is thus not surprising that the
Executive, in construing subsection (27), has not made the distinction plain-
tiffs ask the Court to draw.
Id. (citations omitted).
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rejected the plaintiffs' claim that visa denials could be based only on
national security grounds as inconsistent with the language and prior
agency interpretation of the statute. 7 1 The court held that Kleindienst's
"facially legitimate and bona fide" standard governed the plaintiffs' con-
stitutional claims. 72 After reviewing the State Department's affidavits in
camera, the court concluded that facially legitimate reasons supported
the exclusions. 73
B. The Court of Appeals Opinion
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.74 The court of appeals reviewed the district court's decision and
also considered the plaintiffs' additional claim that the State Department
used the subsection (27) public interest provision to circumvent the
McGovern Amendment's restrictions on the anti-commmunist exclu-
sion. 75 Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, concluded that the dis-
trict court dismissed the case on an insufficient record and remanded for
additional evidence. 76 Judge Bork, in dissent, argued that the record
was complete and that the court should have deferred to the govern-
ment's reading of the statute.77 Judge Bork would have also dismissed
the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as meritless. 78
In assessing the plaintiffs' statutory arguments, both the majority
and dissent used the guidelines of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.7 9 Under Chevron, a court must examine a statutory provision to
determine whether Congress had a specific intent regarding the issue in
question. The court considers the language of the statute, the legislative
history, and past administrative practice to ascertain specific congres-
sional intent.8 0 If the court finds a specific congressional intent, it
enforces that intent without regard to the agency's interpretation; if the
court cannot find specific congressional intent, it accords greater defer-
ence to the agency's interpretation. 8 '
71. Id. at 885-86.
72. Id.; see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
73. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 887-88.
74. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.Cir. 1986). The panel consisted ofJudges R. Ginsburg,
Edwards, and Bork.
75. Id. at 1056-57. Plaintiffs failed to raise this claim before the district court, but
briefed and argued it before the court of appeals. After the district court's decision
in Abourezk, but before the case was briefed and argued before the court of appeals,
the District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided a similar case. Allende v.
Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D.Mass. 1985); see supra note 55; see also supra notes 30-37
and accompanying text. In Allende, the district court held that an alien's affiliation
with a subsection (28) organization is not, in itself, a "facially legitimate and bona
fide" reason for exclusion under subsection (27). Id. at 1225.
76. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1056-57.
77. Id. at 1064-68.
78. Id. at 1074-76.
79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053, 1063.
80. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45; Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053.
81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
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1. The Majority Opinion
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of the plain-
tiffs' claim that subsection (27) can only be used for reasons of domestic
security, not for reasons of foreign policy.8 2 The court noted that the
statute's broad language and the legislative history suggest no such con-
gressional intent.83 The court of appeals held, however, that the district
court erred on the activities/entry issue.84 The court noted that,
although the language of the statute standing alone supported the plain-
tiffs' claims, the legislative history was ambiguous and "tugs in more
than one direction."'85 Following Chevron, the majority then examined
previous agency construction of the statute, consisting of four model
examples of subsection (27) exclusions obtained from the Foreign
Affairs Manual and three actual examples of past exclusions. The court
found these examples insufficient to constitute a clear pattern of admin-
istrative practice.86 The court of appeals, therefore, vacated the dismis-
sal and remanded the case for further evidence of past interpretations of
subsection (27).87
The court of appeals accepted plaintiffs' argument, not put before
the district court, that the State Department unlawfully circumvented
the McGovern Amendment by using subsection (27) to exclude aliens
who were members of subsection (28) organizations. 88 The State
Department argued that it denied the applicants admission for reasons
in addition to their membership in subsection (28) organizations.89 The
court rejected this argument, holding that such an interpretation would
rob subsection (27) of its independent scope and meaning, effectively
nullifying the McGovern Amendment. 90 The court held that the rea-
sons for subsection (27) must be independent of the alien's subsection (28)
affiliations and remanded to the district court to reconsider the visa
denials in light of its holding. 91 Because the court resolved the case on
statutory grounds, it did not reach and expressed no opinion on the
82. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1053-54.
85. Id. at 1054. The Senate Reports on the Internal Security Act of 1950, from
which § 212(a)(27) was largely drawn, speak in terms of prejudicial entry. S. REP. No.
2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950); S. REP. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1950). The Conference Committee Report, however, speaks in terms of activities.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 3889, 3906-11.
86. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1054-56.
87. Id. at 1056. The court also ordered that the plaintiffs be permitted sufficient
discovery to contest the State Department's evidence. Id.
88. Id. at 1056-57; see supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
89. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1057.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1058-60. The court stated that
when an alien is a member of a proscribed organization, so that subsection
(28) applies, the government may bypass that provision and proceed under
subsection (27) only if the reason for the threat to the 'public interest[, ...
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plaintiffs' constitutional claims.9 2
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Bork dissented, contending that because the language and legisla-
tive history of a 1941 predecessor to subsection (27) makes several ref-
erences to prejudicial "entry" as opposed to "activities," Congress must
have meant for "activities" to encompass the act of "entry."9 3 While
acknowledging the ambiguous nature of the legislative history, Judge
Bork argued that the court, in following Chevron, ought to defer to the
State Department's reasonable interpretation of the statute and con-
cluded that a remand would probably not lead to any evidence more
dispositive of the question.9 4
Judge Bork also argued that the court, by requiring that the reason
for a subsection (27) exclusion be independent of an alien's subsection
(28) affiliations, grossly misread the McGovern Amendment.9 5 He con-
tended that if an alien's affiliation with a subsection (28) organization
raises concerns "in addition to" that membership, a subsection (27)
exclusion is appropriate.9 6 These additional concerns would include an
alien's affiliation with a government adversarial to the United States.
9 7
Judge Bork argued that this formulation would maintain the independ-
ent scope and meaning of subsections (27) and (28) while preserving the
Executive's power in foreign affairs.98
After resolving the statutory arguments, Judge Bork reached and
rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.99 He dismissed the plain-
tiffs' suggestion that the first amendment prohibits basing visa decisions
on the content of an alien's anticipated speech as a question answered
by Kleindienst.'0 0 Judge Bork noted that such an argument is also irrele-
vant because the State Department excluded the applicants for their
welfare, safety, or security' is independent of the fact of membership in or affilia-
tion with the proscribed organization.
Id. at 1058. (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 1060 n.24.
93. Id. at 1064-65. The statute to which Judge Bork referred is the Act of June
20, 1941, ch. 209, 55 Stat. 252. The Act reads in relevant part:
That whenever any American diplomatic or consular official knows or has
reason to believe that any alien seeks to enter the United States for the pur-
pose of engaging in activities which will endanger the public safety of the
United States, he shall refuse to issue to any such alien [a visa] ... entitling
such alien to present himself for admission into the United States.
Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1065; see S. REP. No. 386, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1941); see also
87 CONG. REc. 4757 (1941). Judge Bork noted that § 22(1) of The Internal Security
Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, which incorporated the 1941 law, was seen by its
drafters as broadening rather than constricting the grounds for exclusion. Abourezk,
785 F.2d at 1064-66.
94. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1066-68.
95. Id. at 1071.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1074.
99. Id. at 1074-76.
100. Id. at 1074-75; see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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governmental affiliations rather than their expected speech. 1 1
IV. Analysis
This Note contends that the majority's opinion in Abourezk is unsatisfying
and result-oriented. The court attempted to forge a tenable balance
between two compelling yet contradictory imperatives: the Administa-
tion's constitutionally suspect use of the immigration laws as a means of
silencing alien critics, 10 2 and the tradition of judicial deference to the
coordinate branches in cases involving immigration, foreign policy, and
national security.10 3 The decision reflects a belief in the need to pre-
serve Executive flexibility in foreign policy areas, 10 4 coupled with an
attempt to reach a palatable result. In doing so, however, the majority
distorted the rules of statutory interpretation to avoid the case's thorny
constitutional issues.
A. The Activities/Entry Issue
1. Chevron: Use by the Majority and Dissent
The majority's analysis of the activities/entry issue is seriously flawed.
The legislative history indicates that Congress never considered the
issue of exclusion based on "entry" as opposed to "activities."' 1 5 Con-
sequently, Judge Bork has the better view, concluding that Chevron com-
pels deference to a reasonable agency interpretation when faced with
two plausible statutory readings and an inconclusive legislative his-
tory.' 06 The majority agreed that Chevron requires consideration of
agency interpretation in determining congressional intent behind an
ambiguous statute. The majority concluded, however, that the existing
record was inadequate to demonstrate congressional acquiescence to
prior agency construction of the statute. 10 7 As the dissent points out,
however, additional evidence would be unlikely to yield significant new
insights about congressional intent.' 0 8 Also, any argument based on
inferences drawn from congressional inaction will necesarily be ancil-
lary.' 0 9 Thus, it seems that an aversion to the outcome mandated by
101. Id. at 1075.
102. See supra notes 1-6, 57-64 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
104. SeeAbourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2.
105. Indeed, the majority seems to concede as much. Id. at 1054 n.l 1. Judge
Ginsburg deduced from this observation that the Court ought to focus instead on the
statutory language rather than the committee reports, but noted that the language
might be the result of sheer inadvertence. Id.
106. Id. at 1066.
107. Id. at 1054-55.
108. Id. at 1067-68. The majority believed that a decision regarding the probative
weight of evidence uncovered on remand should await the results of further discov-
ery. Id. at 1056 n.14. This position begs the question of whether, considering the
probable usefulness of additional evidence, a remand is warranted in resolving the
issues before the court.
109. Id. at 1054-55. A presumption of Congressional acquiescence is far stronger
if Congress recodifies and reenacts the law at issue after administrative interpretation
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Chevron motivated the majority's decision to remand for additional
evidence.
2. Chevron Inapplicable When Constitutional Rights Implicated
The Chevron analysis was probably not applicable to the State Depart-
ment's interpretation of the McCarran Act. In Chevron, the court of
appeals found that the language and the legislative history of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of J9 77 were ambiguous.' 10 The court disagreed
with the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the
Amendments and substituted its own interpretation for the agency's."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "if [a] statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute .... 11112 The Chevron court concluded that if Congress
implicitly leaves to an administrative agency the task of filling gaps in a
statute, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency." 113
An administrative agency cannot answer constitutional ques-
tions.114 Deference under Chevron is therefore unwarranted when an
agency's interpretation of a statute implicates constitutional rights.
Such a construction of a statute cannot be the "reasonable interpreta-
tion" of which Chevron speaks. 115 Because the State Department's con-
struction of subsection (27) raises constitutional questions, the courts in
Abourezk should have independently decided the scope and meaning of the
statute using established principles of statutory construction. t 1 6
becomes apparent. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 (1969) ("Where...
there is no indication that a subsequent Congress has addressed itself to the particu-
lar problem, we are unpersuaded that silence is tantamount to acquiescence .... );
accord Jones v. Liberty Glass, 332 U.S. 524, 533-34 (1947); Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 are
located at Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
112. Id. at 843.
113. Id. The Court stated that
[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44.
114. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975);Johnson v. Robinson, 415
U.S. 361, 368 (1974); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1958); Public Utilities
Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958).
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
116. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 886 (D.D.C. 1984) ("There are, of
course, significant First Amendment implications to the statute.").
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B. The Circumvention Issue
The majority's resolution of the circumvention issue does not derive
from a faithful reading of the McCarran Act or the McGovern Amend-
ment. Neither the majority nor the dissent suggests an interpretation of
the McCarran Act and the McGovern Amendment which would ade-
quately address the problem of political manipulation of visa decisions.
The majority held that the State Department may exclude aliens affili-
ated with particular foreign governments pursuant to subsection
(27). '7 It is highly unlikely that, in enacting either the McCarran Act or
the McGovern Amendment, Congress intended to have the arbitrary
distinction between a communist alien's official or non-official status be
the deciding factor in visa decisions. The court of appeals decision con-
ceivably would cause the exclusion of Borge and Finlay pursuant to sub-
section (27) due to their positions with the Nicaraguan and Cuban
governments,"18 while Pasti and Lezcano would be admitted under the
McGovern Amendment." 1 9 Neither the language nor the legislative his-
tory of these enactments suggest such a distinction.
The majority, by permitting the exclusion of those aliens who would
make the most important contributions to an informed and uninhibited
foreign policy debate, forges a troubling compromise. The protection
of speech concerning governmental affairs is a central purpose of the
first amendment.' 20 Visiting foreign officials offer a first-hand perspec-
tive on the impact of United States foreign policies abroad. The right to
meet and speak with such officials should receive greater protection than
Abourezk provides.
V. Constitutional Doctrines of Statutory Construction as a Means of
Curbing Abuses of the Immigration Power
The court in Abourezk avoided reaching the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims by disposing of the case on statutory grounds; however, constitu-
tional interests are relevant in choosing between alternative interpreta-
tions of a vague and ambiguous statute. Part V of this Note argues that
the doctrines of clear statement and standardless delegation require a
117. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d 1043, 1057-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986). "We do not reject
affiliation with a particular foreign government as beyond the pale of subsection
(27)." Id. at 1059.
118. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
120. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating Alabama statute prohibit-
ing political campaigning on election day). In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931), the Supreme Court invalidated a California statute prohibiting the public dis-
play of a red flag. The Court noted that "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes may be made by lawful means .. .is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system." Id. at 369. See generally A. MEiKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) (arguing that the speech
most worthy of first amendment protection is speech relating to the political conduct
of government); L. TRIBE, supra note 47, § 12-1, at 577-79.
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narrow construction of subsection (27) in order to avoid the possible
constitutional conflict created by a more expansive reading.
A. Constitutional Considerations in the Construction of Subsection
(27)
1. Subsection (27) Not Necessarily a Full Exercise of the Congressional
Immigration Power
Congressional power to regulate immigration is plenary and unquali-
fied. 12 ' Accordingly, courts subject congressionaljudgments to exclude
certain categories of aliens to only the most limited judicial review.1 22
Kleindienst unequivocally affirmed this principle by holding that Con-
gress's power over immigration expressly outweighed the first amend-
ment rights of citizens. 123
The Abourezk courts assumed that the Kleindienst analysis disposes of
all constitutional challenges to the ideological exclusion provisions of
the McCarran Act. 124 Abourezk, however, differs from Kleindienst in a fun-
damental respect. Kleindienst involved a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the McCarran Act's subsection (28) anti-communist
provision.125 Subsection (28) exhaustively describes the affiliations and
actions which render a communist alien excludable from the United
States. 12 6 In that subsection, Congress's assertion of the full extent of
its legislative power is unambiguous. In contrast, subsection (27) of the
McCarran Act, the "public interest" provision,12 7 is a general, catch-all
provision. Because of the vagueness of its language, it is not clear how
far Congress intended the provision to reach. It is unclear that Con-
gress meant in subsection (27) to exercise the full extent of its Constitu-
tional power over immigration. The courts, therefore, should employ
the traditional tools of statutory construction to determine the true
scope and meaning of subsection (27).
2. The Constitutional Interest. The Citizens' Constitutional Right to Receive
Information and Ideas
The first amendment protects the right to receive information and
ideas.' 28 The right to receive information correlates to the right to
121. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
124. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F.Supp. 880, 891 (D.D.C. 1984); see also id. 785 F.2d
1043, 1074-76 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting). The majority of the court of
appeals seemed to implicitly accept Kleindienst as controlling plaintiffs' constitutional
claims, although it declined to reach them.
125. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 754-56 (1972).
126. See supra note 24.
127. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
128. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762-63 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943) and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); see also Island
Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (prohibiting local
school boards from removing books from libraries because of the ideas they contain);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating mail censorship regulations
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speak-a restriction of one necessarily curtails the other. 129 As Justice
Brennan noted, concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 3 0 "It]he dis-
semination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing [per-
sons] are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."''
The Supreme Court has upheld the right to receive information and
ideas in contexts where the speaker enjoyed no first amendment protec-
tion. In Lamont, the Court struck down section 305 of the Postal Service
and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962.132 Section 305 mandated
postal interception of foreign "communist political propaganda" and
allowed the addressee to receive such information only if he returned a
card indicating his affirmative desire to receive it. 133 Although, as Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out in a concurrence, foreign governments and
political groups enjoy no first amendment right to use the U.S. mails to
disseminate political propaganda,' 3 4 the Court held that the return card
requirement constituted an "unconstitutional abridgement of the
addressee's first amendment rights."' 13 5
The Court has also recognized the right of citizens to receive infor-
mation and ideas in the immigration context. In Kleindienst, the Court
held that an unadmitted and nonresident alien has no constitutional
right to enter this country. 13 6 The Court recognized, however, that the
citizens who invited the alien to the United States have a first amend-
ment interest in meeting with him.13 7 Although Kleindienst ultimately
held that Congress's expressed interest in excluding certain classes of
aliens outweighed the citizens' first amendment interest, the citizens'
interest in exchanging ideas with aliens did rise to constitutional magni-
tude. Thus, a court should consider the first amendment interest in
receiving information whenever construing a vague and ambiguous
statute.
in a prison); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not... of the broadcasters, which is paramount.");
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a law
requiring the Postmaster General to deliver foreign mailing of unsealed "communist
propaganda" only upon addressee's request).
129. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 409.
130. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
131. Id. at 308; see also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 120, at 25 ("... the point of
ultimate interest [of speech] is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the
hearers.").
132. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302-04.
133. Id. at 302-06. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the first
amendment does not protect "political propaganda prepared or printed by or on
behalf of a foreign government." Id. at 308.
134. Id. at 307.
135. Id. (emphasis added). The Court has also rejected the claim that prison
inmates' mail may be censored because they enjoy narrower first amendment rights
than do free citizens, reasoning that this argument "fails to recognize that the first
amendment rights of free citizens are implicated in the censorship of prisoner mail."
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974).
136. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
137. Id. at 762-65.
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1B. Doctrine of Clear Statement
1. The Clear Statement Rule
An important principle of constitutional jurisprudence is that, where
fairly possible, statutes should be construed to avoid serious questioning
of their constitutionality.13 8 Courts traditionally construe statutes nar-
rowly to avoid infringing fundamental liberties.' 3 9 Although Congress
may exercise the full extent of its constitutional powers, implicating
even fundamental liberties, it may do so only by a clear statement of this
intent. 140 If narrow construction is an obstacle to Congress exercising
the full extent of its powers, clear statement is the means Congress must
use to overcome this obstacle.
The Court followed this doctrine of clear statement in Kent v. Dul-
les.' 4 1 In Kent, the Court avoided a serious constitutional question by
narrowly construing a statute. The Court found that section 21 la of the
Passport Act of 1926142 did not give the Executive the authority to deny
a passport to a U.S. citizen based on his alleged Communist affilia-
tions.14 3 The Court stated that where
activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of
an American citizen... are involved, we will construe narrowly all dele-
gated powers that curtail or dilute them.... We hesitate to find in this
broad, generalized... [provision] an authority to trench so heavily on the
rights of the citizen. 14 4
Importantly, the Court did not find the statute itself unconstitutional, but
merely found that an expansive interpretation of the statute would raise
serious constitutional questions avoided by a more narrow reading.' 45
Similarly, in Greene v. McElroy, 14 6 the Court stated that, before it
138. United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1931); see also United States v. Clark, 455 U.S. 23, 27 (1980);
Califano v. Yamaski, 422 U.S. 682, 693 (1979); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932); United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
139. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-17, at 288-89.
140. Id.; see also id. § 5-8, at 243.
141. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
142. The Passport Act of 1926, ch. 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 21 la (1982)) (stating in relevant part that "[tihe Secretary of State may grant and
issue passports, and cause passports to be issued and verified... under such rules as
the President may designate and prescribe....
143. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129-30.
144. Id. at 129.
145. Id. at 130. The Court stated that
[w]e would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold
that Congress by § 1185 and § 21 Ia had given the Secretary [of State]
authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associa-
tions. Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent
one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizen's right
of free movement.
Id.
146. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). Greene involved several statutes directing the Depart-
ment of Defense to develop military procurement procedures. The Court ruled that
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interprets a statute to authorize government actions infringing on con-
stitutionally protected interests,
it must be made clear that the President or Congress specifically has
decided that the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and
has authorized their use .... Without explicit action by lawmakers deci-
sions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by
default to administrators who, under our system of government are not
empowered to decide them.
147
The Court further noted that this doctrine applied "even to areas where it is
possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition." 14 8
2. Applying the Clear Statement Doctrine in the Immigration Area
Despite the Supreme Court's declarations that Congress possesses ple-
nary and unrestricted power over immigration, aliens, and foreign rela-
tions, 14 9 the Court on numerous occasions has narrowly construed
immigration statutes. For example, in Kessler v. Strecker,150 the govern-
ment attempted to deport a resident alien who, in his application for
citizenship, admitted to brief membership in the Communist Party after
his entry into the United States.' 5 1 The Court narrowly construed the
deportation statute under which the government was proceeding, 152
holding that "[i]f Congress meant that past membership, of no matter
how short duration or how far in the past, was to be a cause of present
deportation the purpose could have been clearly stated."' 153 In Bridges v.
these statutes did not authorize the establishment of an industrial security clearance
denying pre-termination hearings to adversely affected employees. Id. at 506-09.
147. Id. at 507.
148. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
149. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text. The rule of strict construction
of immigration statutes does not emerge from the Court's traditional strict construc-
tion of criminal statutes. Deportation, though a harsh penalty, has always been con-
sidered a civil, rather than a criminal sanction. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (the deportation of an alien under the Alien Registration Act of
1940 is not a civil penalty not subject to prohibition against ex post facto laws); Mah-
ler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (the deportation provision of Alien Act of 1920
does not violate proscription against ex post facto laws).
150. 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
151. Id. at 23-24.
152. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended by the Act of
June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008. Section 1 provided for the exclusion of "aliens
who believe in, advise, advocate, or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with
any organization, association, society, or group, that believes in, advises, advocates,
or teaches ... the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States .. " Id. § 1.
Section 2 provided that
"any alien who, at any time after entering the United States, is found to have
been at the time of entry, or to have become thereafter, a member of any of the
classes of aliens enumerated" in § 1, shall, upon warrant of the Secretary of
Labor, be taken into custody and deported, in the manner provided by law.
Kessler, 307 U.S. at 28-29 (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting Act of Oct. 16,
1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012).
153. Kessler, 307 U.S. at 29.
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Wixon, 154 the Court narrowly interpreted the term "affiliation" in the
Alien Registration Act of 1940155 as not authorizing the deportation of
an alien trade unionist who had participated only in the lawful activities
of the Communist Party.1 5 6 In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,'5 7 the Court inter-
preted the term "entry" in the McCarran Act' 5 8 as not encompassing a
permanent resident's return from brief excursions outside the
country.' 59
Similarly, in Delgadillo v. Carmichael,160 the Court narrowly con-
strued the term "entry", in a statute to apply only where "the alien
plainly expected or planned to enter a foreign port or place."' 16 1
Finally, in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,16 2 an alien convicted of multiple
counts of murder in a single proceeding was ordered deported as an
alien convicted "more than once" of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude.' 63 The Court interpreted the statute narrowly to authorize
154. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
155. Act ofJune 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 23(a), 54 Stat. 670, 673. The Act also pro-
vided for deportation of any alien who was "at the time of entering the United States,
or has been at any time thereafter a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumer-
ated in section 1 of the [Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012]. Id. § 23(b)
(emphasis added). This explicitly brought within reach of the Act past members of
proscribed groups, such as was held outside the ambit of the Act in Kessler.
156. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 143.
157. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
158. The McCarran Act defines "entry" as "... any coming of an alien into the
United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether
voluntarily or otherwise .... 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982). In Rosenberg, the
United States sought to deport a long time resident alien following his five hour visit
to Mexico, on the grounds that his homosexuality rendered him a "psychopathic per-
sonality" excludable from the United States under § 212(a)(4) of the McCarran Act.
Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 450-51.
159. Id. at 461. By disposing of the case on statutory grounds, the Court avoided
the petitioner's constitutional claim. The petitioner challenged the government's
application of the § 212(a) (4) exclusion of aliens "afflicted with psychopathic person-
ality" to homosexuals, which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded was
"unconstitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed
within the term 'psychopathic personality.'" Id. at 451.
160. 332 U.S. 388 (1947). In Delgadillo, an alien, lawfully residing in the United
States since 1923, was working aboard a merchant freighter torpedoed in 1942. The
alien's rescuers initially brought him to Cuba to recuperate. The alien then returned
to the United States. In 1944, he was convicted of second degree robbery and was
subsequently deported for having committed a crime within five years of entry into
the United States pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874,
889, as amended by Act ofJune 28, 1940, ch. 438, § 20, 54 Stat. 667, 671 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982)).
161. Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 390. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that
"[w~e will not attribute to Congress a purpose to make [an alien's] right to remain
here dependent on circumstances so fortuitious and capricious as those upon which
the immigration service has seized." Id. at 391.
162. 333 U.S. 6 (1948)
163. Id at 8. Petitioner was ordered deported pursuant to the Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889, as amended by Act ofJune 28, 1940, ch. 438, § 20,
54 Stat. 667, 671 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982)), which provides in relevant
part that
.*. any alien... who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of
imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any crime involving
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deporting only repeat offenders convicted in separate proceedings. 16 4
The Court explained that "we will not assume that Congress meant to
trench on his [the alien's] freedom beyond that which is required by the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."16 5
3. Applying the Clear Statement Doctrine in Ideological Exclusion Cases
The Court has narrowly construed the ideological exclusion provisions
of both the McCarran Act and its prior enactments 16 6 so as to minimize
the chill on domestic political association of aliens. For example, sec-
tion 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 provided that "any alien who
was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time
thereafter a member of the [Communist Party of the United States]...
shall be taken into custody and deported .... -l67 In Rowoldt v.
Perfetto,168 the Court interpreted the seemingly unequivocal terms of
this act narrowly, authorizing deportation of only those aliens proven to
have a "meaningful association" with the Party.1 6 9 The Court stated
that "[t]here must be a substantial basis for finding that an alien commit-
ted himself to the Communist Party in consciousness that he was 'join-
ing an organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a
distinct and active political organization .... 11170
Similarly, in Bonetti v. Rogers, 17 1 where a resident alien had lived in
moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry... shall, upon the war-
rant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported.
Id.
164. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 9-10.
165. Id. at 10.
166. See, e.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987; Alien Registr-
tion Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670; Anarchist Act of 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012.
167. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1008 (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)). Congress subsequently reenacted § 22 of the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950 as § 212(a) (28) of the McCarran-Walter Act. See Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
168. 355 U.S. 115 (1958).
169. Id. at 120.
170. Id. (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954)). The Court subse-
quently used the Perfelto standard to enjoin deportations where the Government
failed to sustain its burden of establishing that an alien's association with the Com-
munist Party was meaningful. In Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469
(1963), the testimony of two witnesses that petitioner had been a dues paying mem-
ber of the Los Angeles Communist Party, attended meetings, and attended the Party
convention was insufficient to support his order of deportation absent proof of his
awareness of the party's political program. Id. at 474-80. Gastelum-Quinones involved
§ 241(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat 163, 205
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)). This provision was the direct recodified succes-
sor to § 22 of the Internal Security Act and incorporated its language almost identi-
cally. See Gastelum-Quinones, 374 U.S. at 470-71.
171. 356 U.S. 691 (1958). In Bonetti, petitioner, a resident alien first admitted into
the United States in 1923, was a member of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1936.
Id. In 1937 he left the United States to fight with the Spanish Republican Army. Id.
Petitioner was readmitted for permanent residence in 1938 as a quota immigrant. Id.
at 692-93. In 1951 he was ordered deported pursuant to § 22 of the Internal Secur-
ity Act for his Communist affiliations between 1932 and 1936.
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the United States for two non-contiguous periods, and had been a Com-
munist Party member during his initial residency, the Court held that
the statutory phrase "at the time of entering the United States, or at any
time thereafter" referred only to the alien's most recent lawful admis-
sion into the United States. 17 2 The Court noted that "'[w]hen Con-
gress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of len-
ity.' "173 These cases aptly illustrate the Court's attitude towards the
immigration power. Rhetorically, the Court manifests a strong respect
for Congress's power over immigration. In practice, however, the Court
applies principles of statutory construction to overturn unduly harsh or
intrusive immigration laws. 174
C. Doctrine of Standardless Delegation
1. The Traditional Standardless Delegation Doctrine
Courts scrutinize broad delegations of legislative power to the Executive
to see if they compromise the principle of separation of powers.' 75
Although statutory delegations of legislative power are unconstitutional
when lacking meaningful standards to guide the discretion of adminis-
trators, modem courts generally uphold legislative delegations. 17 6 A
legislative delegation passes constitutional scrutiny if Congress "lay[s]
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body . . . [authorized to exercise delegated powers] is directed to
conform." 177
172. Id. at 696-97.
173. Id. at 699 (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
174. This type of narrowing construction would be particularly appropriate in the
case of § 212(a) (27) of the McCarran Act. This is especially true when viewed in light
of its statutory predecessor, § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The McCarran
Act incorporated the language of the Internal Security Act almost exactly.
Title I, § 1(b) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 states that "[n]othing in this Act
shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish military or civilian censorship or
in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States ..." The Internal Security Act of 1950, ch.
1024, § 1, 64 Stat. 987.
Judge Bork noted in his dissent in Abourezk that "[w]hen Congress enacts a new
statute that repeats the language contained in an older statute, there is a heavy pre-
sumption that Congress meant the same thing in each, particularly when the new
statute is in part a codification of existing law." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043,
1064 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
175. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). "That Congress cannot delegate leg-
islative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 692.
176. See Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage, 289
U.S. 266 (1933) (Congress has power to delegate authority to Radio Commission to
eliminate stations and licenses); J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928) (Congress's delegation of power authorizing the President to regulate import
duties is not unconstitutional); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)
(authority to make administrative rule is not unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power).
177. J. T. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
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In the early 1930s, the Supreme Court used the standardless dele-
gation doctrine to strike down certain sections of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. 178 In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,179 the
Court held that provisions of the Act giving the President the power to
prescribe mandatory "Codes of Fair Competition" governing any trade
or industry were unconstitutional because they failed to "prescribe rules
of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by
appropriate administrative procedure."' 8 0 Similarly, in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, l8 ' the Court struck down a section-of the Act because "[t]he
Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be
dealt with as he pleased."' 8 2
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining are the only two cases declaring
a statute unconstitutional because of excessive delegation.18 3 Since the
1930s, the Court has upheld extremely broad delegations of legislative
authority, 184 reasoning that an increasingly complex and technical soci-
ety requires that Congress have the ability to delegate broad fact-finding
powers to subordinate bodies.' 8 5 The Court will now overturn a dele-
gation of legislative authority only if it can be shown that "there is an
absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator's action, so
that it would be impossible, in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether
the will of Congress has been obeyed .... ,"186 This has proven to be a
highly deferential standard,' 8 7 prompting one justice to dismiss uncon-
178. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
179. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
180. Id. at 541.
181. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
182. Id. at 418. The Court invalidated § 9(c) of the Act, which authorized the Pres-
ident to prohibit the interstate transportation of the petroleum produced in excess of
state mandated limits. Id. at 420.
183. See Comment, The Fourth Branch: Reviving the Non-delegation Doctrine, 1984
B.Y.U. L. REV. 619, 630.
184. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, delegating control of commodity prices in time of war to Price Administra-
tor, was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146 (1941) (section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative
power); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) (Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, authorizing Administrator and industry
committees to classify industries and fix minimum wages, was not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533
(1939) (provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50
Stat. 246, authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to regulate milk prices and other
aspects of the milk industry was not an unconstitutional delegation by Congress).
185. Opp Cotton Mills, 312 U.S. at 145.
186. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-26.
187. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975) (Congress could
delegate the power to regularize distribution of alcoholic beverages to Indian tribal
councils on a reservation); District of Columbia v.John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S.
100, 106-07, 110 (1953) (Congress had authority to delegate lawmaking authority to
a District of Columbia municipal corporation); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950) (the Act ofJune 21, 1941, which authorized the
President to set necessary regulations on entry into and departure from the United
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stitutional delegation as a "moribund doctrine."' 188
2. The Modern Standardless Delegation Doctrine
Recently, some judges and commentators have called for a resurrection
of the standardless delegation doctrine, contending that Congress has
increasingly failed to prescribe specific standards in statutory delega-
tions of legislative powers. 18 9 Indeed, the Court has resuscitated the
doctrine recently, but as a method of statutory construction, not as a way
of overturning legislation.
In two recent cases, problems of unconstitutional delegation led the
Court to narrowly construe excessively broad delegations of legislative
States, was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742, 744-45 (1948) (authority granted under the Renegotiation Act,
for determination of excessive profits realized on war subcontracts, was not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative body); Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1948) (Title II of Housing and Rent Act
of 1947 prescribing adequate standards for the guidance of administrative action did
not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power); Fahey v. Mallonnee, 332 U.S. 245,
250 (1947) (Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, which authorized Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to prescribe regulations for the appointment of conservators, was not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative functions); American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1946) (section 1 1(b)(2) of the 1935 Public Utility Holding
Company Act was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
SEC); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516 (1944) (the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, authorizing the Price Administrator to fix maximum rents for housing in
defense-rental areas, did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) ("Public interest" stan-
dard governing exercise of powers delegated to FCC not so vague and indefinite as
to create an unconstitutional delegation of power); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940) (standards specified by § 4, II(c) of Bituminous
Coal Act of 1937, did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power).
188. See National Cable Television Ass'n. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (comparing the standardless delegation doctrine to
the substantive due process approach of the 1930s).
189. See Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("We ought not to shy away from our
judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely
out of concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doc-
trines of the pre-New Deal era. If the non-delegation doctrine has fallen into the
same desuetude as have substantive due process and restrictive interpretations of the
Commerce Clause, it is, as one writer phrased it, 'a case of death by association.' ");
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275-78 (1967) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The
failure to provide adequate standards in § 5(a)(1)(D) [of the Subversive Activities
Control Act] reflects Congress' failure to have made a 'legislative judgment.' ");
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383-85 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam)
(Scalia, J., writing for the panel) (approving the use of the delegation doctrine as a
means of narrowly construing otherwise overbroad delegations); see also J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 131-134 (1980);J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 78-94 (1978); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNrrED STATES 129-146, 297-299 (1979); Gerwitz, The Courts, Congress and Executive
Policy Making, L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 49-65 (1976); McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of Legislative Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1127-30 (1977); Wright, Beyond
DiscretionatyJustice, 81 YALE LJ. 575, 582-87 (1972); Comment, supra note 183.
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authority. In National Cable Television Ass'. v. United States,19 0 the Court
narrowly interpreted the language of the Independent Offices Appropri-
ations Act of 1952191 to avoid the constitutional questions raised by a
delegation of the general taxing power to an administrative agency.
192
Similarly, in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute,19 3 a plurality of the Court construed the language of the Occu-
pational Health and Safety Act of 1970194 narrowly and noted that the
Government's interpretation of the statute "make[s] such a 'sweeping
delegation of legislative power' that it might be unconstitutional under
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States... and Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan.... A construction of the statute that avoids that kind of open-
ended grant should certainly be favored."' 195
3. Standardless Delegation in the Foreign Policy Area
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the Executive pos-
sesses, in addition to those powers delegated by Congress, inherent
power over foreign affairs. 19 6 This inherent foreign affairs power fol-
lows as an inevitable incident of national sovereignty.19 7 Although the
Court traditionally uses a more lenient standard to review broad foreign
policy delegations to the Executive, 198 the Court has construed such
190. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
191. Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952, ch. 376, 65 Stat. 268, 292.
192. National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 340-43. The statute authorized
administrative agencies to charge various fees to the industries they regulated to off-
set operations costs. The agency could consider the "public interest" in setting fees
under this statute. Finding that such discretionary rate-setting constituted a tax upon
the industries, the Court construed the statute strictly to permit the agency to charge
fees based solely on the services they rendered to a particular fee-payer. Justice Doug-
las, writing for the Court, noted that "Schechter and Hampton lead us to read the Act
narrowly to avoid constitutional problems." Id. at 342.
193. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
194. 84 Stat. 1590, 1594 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982)).
The section requires the Secretary of Labor to "set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity." Id.
The Secretary interpreted "to the extent feasible" to mean that any standard would
be acceptable provided it did not materially impair the viability of the industry. Indus-
trial Union, 448 U.S. at 639.
195. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 644-46. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality,
adopted a sort of clear statement rule with respect to standardless delegations in this
case. "In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that
Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented power over American
industry that would result from the Government's view of §§ 3(8) and 6(b)(5)." Id. at
645.
196. See United States ix rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1949)
("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so
stems not alone from legislative power, but is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation.").
197. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
198. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Court
noted that
[piractically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more
Acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in
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delegations narrowly when fundamental rights are implicated. 199 For
example, in both Greene v. McElroy and Kent v. Dulles, the Court narrowly
construed statutory language to avoid a standardless delegation of legis-
lative authority which would unduly burden a constitutional interest. 20 0
Similarly, on two separate occasions the Court found a impermissible
lack of statutory standards or guidelines governing penalties for delin-
quency under the draft law. The court construed the Selective Service
Act 20 ' narrowly, holding the local draft boards' to be unauthorized. 20 2
respect of subjects affecting foreign relations which either leave the exercise
of power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more gen-
eral than that which has been considered requisite with regard to domestic
affairs.
Id. at 324; see Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-83 (1981) (upholding
Executive's power to extinguish citizen's property rights in Iranian-American agree-
ment to free American hostages in Iran); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965)
(The Passport Act of 1926 validly grants authority to President to refuse validation of
passports for Cuban travel); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 543 (1950) (the Act of June 21, 1941, which authorized the President to set
necessary regulations on entry into and departure from the United States, was not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
199. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-17, at 288-89.
200. Id.; see supra notes 139-48. Indeed, in Kent the Court said that
[s]ince we start with an exercise by an American citizen of an activity included
in constitutional protection, we will not readily infer that Congress gave the
Secretary of State the unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it.... If that
liberty is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking function of
the Congress.... And if that power is delegated the standards must be ade-
quate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
201. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 611 (1948) as amended by Mili-
tary Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-472 (1983)).
202. See Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 304-308 (1970) (invalidating
local draft board's accelerated induction of eligible registrant in retaliation for his
participation in antiwar protests); Oestereich v. Selective Service System, 393 U.S.
233, 237 (1968) (invalidating local draft board's revocation of a divinity student's
statutory exemption from induction in retaliation for his participation in antiwar
protests).
The Court reasoned in both cases that, without express statutory guidelines, it
would not infer that Congress delegated unrestricted authority to manipulate the
induction process so as to penalize registrants engaging in constitutionally protected
speech. The Court noted that
[t]he power under the regulations to declare a registrant "delinquent" has no
statutory standard or even guidelines. The power is exercised entirely at the
discretion of the local board. It is a broad, roving authority, a type of admin-
istrative absolutism not congenial to our law making traditions.... [In order
for the practice to be upheld] [s]tandards would be needed by which the
legality of a declaration of "delinquency" could be judged.
Gutknecht, 396 U.S. at 306; see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (invali-
dating federal statute which provided that when a communist organization is under a
final order to register it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization to
work in a defense facility). Justice Brennan, concurring, argued that
[b]ecause the statute contains no meaningful standard by which the Secretary
[of Defense] is to govern his designations, and no procedure to contest or
review his designations, the "defense facility" formulation is constitutionally
insufficient to mark the "field within which the [Secretary] is to act so that it
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Thus, even in the foreign policy area the Court will not construe statutes
as conferring on the Executive unrestricted discretion to encroach on
protected liberties.
4. Standardless Delegation in the First Amendment Area
The standardless delegation doctrine is particularly relevant in the first
amendment area. The Supreme Court has held licensing systems vest-
ing unrestricted discretion in government officials to deny the right to
speak or assemble in public to be unconstitutional. 20 3 Licensing
schemes pass constitutional muster only if they provide "narrowly
drawn, reasonable, and definite standards for officials to follow." 20 4
The absence of standards permits government officials to practice "cov-
ert forms of discrimination" 20 5 based on the content of the speakers'
views. 20 6 Because the right to receive information correlates to the
right to speak, 20 7 using the visa issuance process to exclude disfavored
speakers produces results analogous to the ones prohibited by these
cases. The Supreme Court, therefore, should not read the public inter-
may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will."
Id. at 273 (quoting in part Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1943)).
203. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947 (1984) (statute which sets imprecise restrictions on charitable solicitation, a form
of protected speech, is unconstitutionally overbroad); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1968) (law subjecting free expression in publicly owned place to the
prior restraint of a license, without narrow and definite standards is unconstitu-
tional); Kunz v. State of New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (city ordinance prescribing
no appropriate standard for action and giving official discretion in advance to control
the right to speak on religious matters, is invalid); Saia v. State of New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (city ordinance forbidding sound device except with official permission,
but providing no standards for such permission is unconstitutional); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute regulating picketing and other expression by labor
is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(ordinance forbidding public assembly in streets without a permit from official, who
may refuse such permit based on mere opinion that assembly will cause riots, is inva-
lid); Lovell v. City of Griffith, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (law prohibiting distribution of
literature without permission held unconstitutional as its coverage was overbroad
and granted too much discretion to officials).
204. Niemotko v. State of Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) (lack of standards in
license-issuing practice constituted a prior restraint in violation of first and four-
teenth amendments); accord Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state stat-
ute forbidding solicitation for any alleged religious cause without a permit, found
unconstitutional as a prior restraint on free exercise of religion); see also Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (flag misuse statute found unconstitutionally void for
vagueness, as it did not provide standards for defining impermissible conduct).
205. Hefron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1980) (regulation requiring Society to confine solicitation and distribution activities
at a fixed location was a permissible restriction on manner of communicating reli-
gious views).
206. See Shutiesworth, 394 U.S. at 68 (breach of peace statute prohibiting speech
which arouses or disquiets is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965) (statute which gave local authorities "completely
uncontrolled discretion" to permit or prohibit parades or street meetings unconstitu-
tional); L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 733.
207. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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est exclusion of the McCarran Act as giving the Secretary of State unfet-
tered power to encroach on the first amendment interests of U.S.
citizens.
D. The Court's Retreat from Narrow Construction
1. The Court's Ambivalent Approach to Statutory Construction
As previously discussed, the Court has used the clear statement and
standardless delegation doctrines to protect constitutional interests
even in the traditional areas of extreme deference: foreign affairs,
national security, and immigration. Recent cases, however, suggest that
the Court might be returning to a more deferential posture in these
areas. This Note argues, however, that the policy reasons underlying
the clear statement and standardless delegation doctrine are especially
compelling in the Abourezk setting.
2. Return to Deference
The Court has retreated during the last twenty years from the practice of
narrowly construing statutes to protect constitutional interests in the
immigration, national security, and foreign policy areas. The Court has
now returned to giving nearly complete deference to the coordinate
branches. 20 8 For example, in Haig v. Agee, 20 9 an American ex-CIA agent
contended that the revocation of his passport was beyond the statutory
authority granted the President by Congress, and violated his first
amendment right to criticize the government and his fifth amendment
right to travel.2 10 The Court read the Passport Act of 1926211 broadly
to authorize the revocation of passports for national security reasons. 21 2
Similarly, in Regan v. Wald,21 3 the Court upheld a Treasury Department
regulation prohibiting Americans from spending hard currency in
Cuba. 21 4 American citizens challenged the regulation as lacking statu-
208. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
209. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
210. Id. at 287. Agee, the ex-CIA agent, engaged in a campaign of public exposure
of intelligence operations abroad. His activities included revealing the identities of
CIA agents employed in foreign countries. On several occasions these disclosures
led to assassination attempts. See id. at 283-87.
211. Passport Act of 1926, ch. 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 21 la
(1982)). The Act provides in pertinent part: "The Secretary of State may grant and
issue passports... under such rules as the president shall designate and prescribe...
." 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982).
212. Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-307.
213. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
214. Id. at 224-25. The regulation effectively prohibited all citizens from traveling
to Cuba unless they secured a license from the Treasury Department. The Treasury,
however, retained complete regulatory discretion in issuing licenses. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.503 (1986). The right to travel is guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. This right was first recognized in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1957); see supra note 141. Although first amendment rights are implicated by a citi-
zen's right to gather information about foreign countries (see Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas,J, concurring)), the Wald court found that
the restriction did not impermissibly burden first amendment rights because the
Cornell International Law Journal
tory authority and as violating their first and fifth amendment rights to
travel. 21 5 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed that the
regulation lacked statutory authority. 2 16 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 2 17
authorized the regulation and that the regulation's foreign policy justifi-
cations supported the restriction on the right to travel. 2 18
Perhaps the most striking recent example of the Supreme Court's
deference to a coordinate branch is Dames & Moore v. Regan.2 19 The
Dames & Moore Court upheld the power of the Executive to extinguish
citizen's property rights, relying on an implied congressional acquies-
cence. 220 The Court could not find any direct congressional authoriza-
tion for the Executive branch's action, but rather inferred such power
from legislation enacted by Congress and from Congress's historical
acquiescence to a continued Executive practice. 22 '
One may plausibly argue that the Court's statutory interpretation in
Wald, Agee, and Dames & Moore may not constitute renewed deference by
the Court, but rather reflects the weak constitutional challenges of par-
ticular cases. In Agee, the court indicated that the exposure of intelli-
gence agents was not constitutionally protected speech.2 22 In Wald, the
Court distinguished the general ban on travel to Cuba from earlier
restrictions on travel found to be unconstitutional because they were
issued on the basis of political belief or affiliation. 223 In Dames & Moore,
the unconstitutional taking claim was premature pending a demonstra-
tion that the proceedings outlined in the Iranian-American Agreement
were inadequate. 2 24  Despite the weakness of these constitutional
restriction was not selectively applied based on political belief or affiliation, but was
an across-the-board restriction. Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-41; see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965).
215. Wald, 468 U.S. at 224-25.
216. 708 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1983). The court of appeals did not reach the constitu-
tional challenge. Id. at 795.
217. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
218. Wald, 468 U.S. at 235-238, 240-43. Because the Supreme Court held that the
regulation was authorized, it went on to answer the constitutional challenge. Id. at
240.
219. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
220. See id. at 675-88. Dames & Moore involved the Iranian-American agreement to
free the American hostages held in Teheran. Id. at 662-65. The property right at
issue was Dames & Moore's legal claim against Iranian banks and judgment against
the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization. Id. at 667.
221. See id. at 675-88. The Court looked at the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1983 & Supp. 1985), and the Hostage Act of
1868, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982), and concluded that neither constituted specific
authorization for the Executive's action. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-77. The
Court said, however, that "We cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' legisla-
tion in this area," id. at 678, which, when combined with congressional acquiescence
to the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement, caused the Court to find
sufficient authority for the Executive action. Id. at 678-88.
222. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1980).
223. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 241 (1983).
224. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-89 (1980).
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claims, it is undeniable that the Court is more deferential to Executive
actions in the foreign policy area than it has previously been. The pau-
city of successful constitutional challenges in the last twenty years illus-
trates this change.
E. The Use of Narrow Construction to Curb Abuses of the Executive
Immigration Power
1. Potential for Manipulation and Abuse of the Executive's
Immigration Powers
Administrative abuse of discretion in the immigration area largely
escapes meaningful review. Consular visa decisions, for instance, are
not subject to judicial review. 2 25 Decisions by the Secretary of State on
waivers of inadmissibility are similarly unreviewable. 22 6 As Kleindienst
demonstrates, visa decisions violating protected constitutional interests
of citizens are subjected to only minimal scrutiny.22 7 Congress has
explicitly stated that aliens, possessing neither constitutional nor statu-
tory rights to admission, should not be permitted to burden the visa
issuance process with appeals. 228 However, unreviewable discretion in
the immigration area presents the opportunity for abuse and conflicts
sharply with traditional notions of judicial oversight of administrative
action.2 29
225. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1201 (1986).
226. See Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1978); Gomez v. Kissinger, 534
F.2d 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976).
227. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
228. See generally S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
229. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardiner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (access to
judicial review should be restricted only upon a showing of "clear and convincing
evidence" of a contrary legislative intent); American School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulity, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902) (courts generally have jurisdiction to grant
relief if an individual suffers injury caused by the violation of a law by government
officers).
The unreviewability of consular visa decisions has been widely criticized for estab-
lishing a form of administrative absolutism. In a statement submitted to the Presi-
dent's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Professors Louis J. Jaffee and
Henry Hart noted that
[i]t has become a fundamental premise of our jurisprudence that the decision
of weighty matters should almost never be placed in the power of a single
individual free from the control of a superior reviewing body. We search in
vain for any parallel in our institutions for this despotic consular absolutism.
Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Before the House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575, 1578 (Comm. Print 1952) (state-
ment of Professors Henry Hart and Louis J. Jaffee); see also REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME 146-52 (1953); Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 151-52 (1958); Wolff,
Nonreviewability of Consular Visa Decisions: An Unjustified Aberration from American Justice, 5
N.Y.L. SCH.J. COMP. & INT'L L. 341 (1984); Note,Judicial Review of Visa Denials: Reev-
amining Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1977).
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2. The Clear Statement and Standardless Delegation Doctrine
As Processual Restraints
The clear statement and the standardless delegation doctrines are
processual in nature. They do not impose substantive constitutional
limits on the scope of Executive action, but merely prescribe processes
to which the coordinate branches must adhere to achieve substantive
ends. These processes maintain the structural and political integrity of
administrative action. Both doctrines assure that unelected and unac-
countable bureaucrats will not make important political decisions.
Application of these doctrines prevents legislators from avoiding
responsibility for unpopular actions by delegating power to administra-
tors pursuant to broad and vague grants of authority. They also force
the legislature to carefully weigh the consequences and implications of
their actions rather than delegate that function to others. 23 0
3. Narrow Construction of Section 212(a)(27)
Because of their processual nature, the clear statement and standardless
delegation doctrines do not force courts to evaluate the substantive mer-
its of agency actions in the immigration area, but rather require courts
to assess whether the Executive has acted in conformity with the
expressed will of the Legislature. If a narrow construction of an
enabling statute restricts the Executive's action, the Executive need only
seek an explicit legislative mandate for its activities in order to continue.
A narrow construction of the section 212(a) (27) public interest pro-
vision of the McCarran Act would force the Executive to ask for amend-
ments to section 212(a). If the Administration wishes to exclude aliens
such as Borge, Pasti, Lezcano and Finlay, a narrow construction would
force the Administrator either to ask Congress to add to the list of
thirty-three classes of excludable aliens those "who are officials in gov-
ernments or organizations deemed adversarial to the United States" 2 3'
or to repeal the McGovern amendment. Thus, narrow construction of
section 212(a) would prevent abdication of responsibility by Congress
and the Court.
The Court should interpret the subsection (27) public interest
exclusion provision as authorizing only the exclusion of those aliens
whose activities in the United States can be shown to constitute a threat
to national security or safety. 23 2 Under this interpretation, the Execu-
230. See generally supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text. See also L. TRIBE, supra
note 47, § 17-2, at 1140-44 (discussion of Tribe's theory of structural due process).
231. In 1982, for example, Congress expanded from thirty-one to thirty-two the
classes of excludable aliens, by providing that former members of the Nazi party
would henceforth be ineligible for admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(33) (1982).
232. Such activities might include the otherwise legal research of sensitive military
technologies or receiving specialized training in skills which have obvious military
application. See EI-Werfalli v. Shultz, 547 F.Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (district court
upheld the subsection (27) visa denial to a Libyan national studying aircraft mainte-
nance in the United States, finding national security implicated).
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tive would lack the authority to bar aliens it disapproves of politically or
whose entry or presence would create embarrassment, forcing it to
employ other methods of expressing its disapproval.
IV. Conclusion
In Abourezk v. Reagan, the court of appeals attempted to limit the consti-
tutionally suspect abuse of the ideological exclusion provisions of the
McCarran-Walter Act by creatively interpreting the statute. In so doing,
however, the court failed to consider the importance of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claims to the issue of statutory construction. The clear
statement rule and the doctrine of standardless delegation require the
court to construe the vague and ambiguous provisions of Section
212(a)(27) of the McCarran Act narrowly, to avoid encroachment on the
first amendment interests of citizens. The citizens' freedom to speak
and associate with foreign visitors is not adequately protected if it can be
quashed by the talismanic invocation of the government's immigration
power.
Franklin E. Fink

